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ABSTRACT
In a previous paper I described how the tax design called the X Tax would facilitate an international
tax system free of many of the complexities and avoidance opportunities plaguing the existing
international tax regime and also have neutrality properties generally deemed desirable. A choice
must, however, be made between two basic treatments of transborder business transactions  n the
origin and destination principles. The destination-principle approach sidesteps the need to identify
arm’’s length terms of transborder transactions between related business entities  n the transfer-
pricing problem. This serious problem remains in the origin-principle approach, which, however,
presents fewer challenges of monitoring the flow of goods and services across borders, obviates
what I call the “tourism problem” whereby people can reduce their taxes by consuming in a low-tax
jurisdiction and, arguably most important, avoids transition effects associated with introduction of
the tax and subsequent tax rate changes that occur in the destination approach. In this paper I explore
possible special rules for transborder transactions between related parties in an origin-based system
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In a previous paper (Bradford, 2001) I sketched out how the system that I call the X Tax 
might be used to ameliorate a variety of problems in the existing system of international income 
taxation.  The essential device used by the X Tax, shared with several other tax restructuring 
plans, is coordinated treatment of a measure of the income of companies and the earnings of 
workers.  In the company-level tax, consumption replaces the accrual income ideal that, in 
principle, motivates so much of the present tax design.  As a result, it is possible to exclude from 
taxation most financial instruments – or to neutralize their significance for tax purposes – and 
thereby greatly simplify and rationalize the rules. 
The company-level component of the X Tax can be described as a value-added tax 
(VAT) of the consumption type, implemented by the subtraction method (Cnossen, 2002).  As is 
well-known to students of international taxation, there is a fundamental choice to be made in 
such systems regarding the treatment of cross-border purchase and sales (McLure, 1987; Tait, 
1988).  In a destination-based VAT, exports, that is, sales to customers in other countries, are 
excluded from the domestic tax base, and imports are included – that is, not deducted in 
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determining a company’s domestic tax base.  In an origin-based VAT, export sales are treated 
like any other, that is, included in the domestic tax base; similarly, purchases from foreigners, 
like other purchases, are deducted.  (Throughout, this paper presupposes that imports run through 
domestic companies.  Consistent treatment of direct imports by individual consumers, e.g., 
returning tourists or direct sales over the Internet or by mail order, would call for appropriate 
institutional details that I leave largely unspecified.)  As elaborated in the predecessor paper, and 
summarized below, various considerations favor one or the other approach to tax design.  In 
particular, nullifying the transfer-pricing problem is a major strength of the destination principle 
VAT.  Potentially serious incentive effects of tax rate changes in a destination-based system, 
correlatives of incidence effects, would, however, be avoided in an origin-principle system. 
Without repeating in detail the arguments laid out in Bradford (2001), in this paper I 
accept that, in the design of a regime to supplant the income tax on individuals and corporations, 
transition phenomena, in particular, will weigh heavily in favor of keeping the origin-based 
treatment of cross-border purchases and sales of goods and services that characterizes the 
existing income tax system.  This motivates the quest for a way to deal in an origin-based X Tax 
with the transfer-pricing problem, arising in the case of related taxpayers located in different tax 
jurisdictions, that is the focus of this paper. 
As in the case of the predecessor paper, the object of this one is to stimulate discussion 
and reflection.  I know of niceties I am neglecting; no doubt, there are many others of which I am 
unaware.  A desire to avoid delay is my justification for limited citation of the work of others but 
extensive citation of the relevant previous works of mine (most of which are collected in 
Bradford, 2000).  With apologies, I make no attempt to credit systematically the many, many 
works of others from which I have learned about all of this or to which I may implicitly respond.  
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The X Tax in an International Setting 
The X Tax is a variant of the Hall-Rabushka (1995) Flat Tax, an example of what I have 
called a “two-tiered consumption tax” (Bradford 1986).  Other authors have described tax 
systems along similar lines.  I have described versions of my entry in this category in several 
publications (e.g., Bradford 1986, 1996a).  In the interest of making this paper reasonably self-
contained, in the next section I present a brief description that neglects matters such as treatment 
of governments, charitable contributions, and the like. 
Basic X Tax structure 
The X Tax consists of two components:  a business tax and a compensation tax.  Under 
the business tax, all businesses (regardless of legal form) are liable for tax at a single rate on the 
difference between proceeds from sales and purchases from other businesses.  (I mention a 
qualification to this description below.)  In addition, payments to workers are deducted.  Except 
as they are also businesses, individuals are taxed only under the compensation tax, the base of 
which consists of payments for labor services.  Unlike the business tax, the compensation tax is 
levied at graduated rates, with a zero bracket amount and some set of higher rates on larger 
amounts received, up to a top rate that is the same as the business tax rate.  In addition, there 
could be an earned income tax credit, as under the current system. 
Importantly for ease of administration, financial transactions are excluded from both 
business and compensation tax bases.  In the ordinary case, transactions such as borrowing and 
lending, issue and repurchase of stock, payment and receipt of dividends, and the like, do not 
enter the calculation of the taxable base.  In the helpful terminology of the Meade Committee 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies 1978), this is an R-Base (“real” transactions, as opposed to 
“financial” transactions) tax.  (Financial institutions present special problems, which I neglect in  
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this paper.  For some details and some possible solutions to those problems, see Bradford 
1996b.) 
The idea would be to adjust these parameters to raise the needed revenue and achieve the 
desired degree of progressivity of the system.  This is not the context in which to develop what 
might be required to mimic the present system's progressivity.  To have something concrete in 
mind, however, I would guess we could approximate the progressivity of the current U.S. 
income tax system with a rate of business tax of 28-30 percent, which would also be the top rate 
of compensation tax. 
If we neglect the deduction of payments to workers, the business tax component of this 
system constitutes, in the jargon of the tax trade, a value-added tax of the consumption type, 
implemented by the subtraction method.  This is a great help to thinking about the links among 
tax systems in a world of national X Taxes.  For, provided the rate of tax is the same and 
neglecting administrative details, a value-added tax of the subtraction type is essentially 
equivalent to a value-added tax of the invoice-and-credit type, a tax institution with which there 
is a great deal of experience. 
Under the invoice-and-credit method, the selling firm pays a tax on all sales, noting the 
amount of tax on the sales invoice.  A taxable firm making a purchase is allowed a credit against 
tax liability of the amount of tax shown on the invoice.  The effect is that a sale from one 
business to another gives rise to simultaneous payment of tax by the seller and equal credit 
against tax for the buyer.  There is no net tax paid to the government until the point of sale to a 
buyer other than a taxable firm, generally the public.  The invoice-and-credit method value-
added tax thus gives rise to exactly the same flow of revenues to the government as does a  
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subtraction-method value-added tax or a retail sales tax, with the proviso that the same goods 
and services are subject to tax at the same rate. 
The fact that the X Tax allows a deduction for payments to workers (taxed progressively 
via a graduated rate schedule at the individual level) and would presumably include an earned 
income tax credit does not fundamentally change the story from an economic perspective, even 
though it may do so from a legal perspective.  The system can be understood as a subtraction-
method value-added tax, combined with a system of transfers based on earnings for purposes of 
adjusting the vertical distribution of net burdens (Bradford 1987). 
Extension to an International Setting 
The building blocks of the X Tax are business firms.  We can think of it as a tax that 
consolidates transactions among some set of companies, with the base consisting of the net flows 
of goods and services from that set of companies.  In principle, there is considerable room for 
choice about the exact definition that places a company within or outside the taxable circle.  For 
present purposes, however, I imagine rules rather like the ones now used to determine the 
liability for value-added taxes (Lokken (2001) provides a discussion).  Given such conventions, 
no distinction is made between domestic and foreign companies.  All companies operating in the 
United States, for example, are treated alike. 
Two General Approaches:  Origin- and Destination-Based Taxes 
In general, in the purely domestic context, a sale from a company to a customer that is 
not another company is subject to tax, and a purchase from a customer that is not another 
company is not deductible from the tax base.  In the international setting, however, there are two 
main options for the treatment of transactions with customers ("sales to abroad") and suppliers 
("purchases from abroad") who are in another tax jurisdiction.  
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Under most value-added tax systems, no tax is charged on exports, that is, sales to 
abroad; imports, purchases from abroad, are subject to tax.  Not charging value-added tax on 
exports corresponds to excluding sales to abroad from the X Tax base (so they are not subject to 
current tax).  Corresponding to charging value-added tax on imports is denying a deduction for 
business purchases from abroad in the X Tax.  The result is a "destination-based" tax, the idea 
being that the tax is based on the aggregate value of goods and services consumed in the country 
in which it is levied.  Sales destined for another country are excluded from the base of the 
exporting country; imports destined for a country are included in the importing country's base. 
The alternative is to include in the domestic business tax base sales to abroad and to 
allow a deduction for purchases from abroad.  The result is an "origin-based" tax, the idea being 
that the tax is levied on the aggregate value of goods and services produced in the country in 
which it is levied.  Understandably, these two approaches seem very different to the lay person.  
In view of the strong equivalence between these two forms of tax, however – they are 
economically essentially the same, apart from transition effects associated with rate changes and 
apart from the transfer-pricing problems that are the focus of this paper – it is clear that we must 
be careful in basing intuitions on the destination and origin labels.  Distinctions between the two 
approaches encountered in policy debates, especially regarding effects on exports, are often 
wrong (Feldstein and Krugman, 1990). 
Economic Equivalence between the Approaches:  The Basics 
A numerical illustration will remind readers of the sense in which the two approaches are 
economically equivalent.  Suppose the world consists of two countries, the United States and 
France, between which trade is currently and has in the past been exactly balanced (so the value 
of goods and services exported from the one exactly equals the value of goods and services  
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imported in return, period by period).  Both countries produce a basic consumption good, say 
corn, which sells for $1 per bushel.  In addition, computers are produced in one of the countries, 
say the United States, selling for $1000 each. 
In the illustrative equilibrium, 1m of the computers are sold by U.S. companies to buyers 
in France for a total value of $1b.  Companies in France export to U.S. companies 1b bushels of 
corn at $1 each.  The United States has an origin-based X Tax (so with no adjustment at the 
border) with a business tax rate of 25 percent.  For purposes of this and other such exercises in 
this paper, we can ignore the compensation tax or assume it is levied on all earnings at the 
business tax rate and withheld by the companies.  So the situation is transactionally equivalent to 
a 25 percent value-added tax of the consumption type. 
Suppose in the illustrative situation computers are produced without any inputs of labor 
or other materials.  The tax paid by the computer sellers on their export sales is $250m and the 
owners of the companies get to keep $750m.  The outlay of $1b for the import of corn by 
relevant companies gives rise to a deduction of $1b and the resale to U.S. customers to an 
inclusion of $1b for no net tax.  In France, let us suppose, there is no company tax; the $1b paid 
for the corn is paid in turn to owners of farms, to French workers and perhaps to the French 
government (in taxes on owners and workers), who together spend a total of $1b for the imported 
corn. 
In the alternative case, suppose that the United States employs a destination-based tax.  
That is to say, firms are allowed to exclude the export sales from their X-tax calculations but 
may not deduct the amount paid to foreign suppliers for imports.  The set of prices in the United 
States and France that we stipulated to prevail in equilibrium under the origin-based tax cannot 
characterize equilibrium under the destination-based tax.  Under the former set of prices,  
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exporting computers from the United States to France would be highly profitable (which is why 
people naturally think that a shift to such a tax would stimulate exports), while the U.S. importer 
of corn would suffer losses.  We can, however, readily specify other sets of prices that will, 
however, give rise to exactly the same activities as we observed in the origin-based tax world. 
For example, if the price level (not just the price of corn) in France were lower by 25 
percent, the former equilibrium conditions would be realized.  In that case, the price of a bushel 
of corn in France would be $0.75, instead of $1.00.  A computer would sell for $750, instead of 
$1000.  Unspecified in the example, the nominal wage in France would have to be lower, too, by 
25 percent, so the real wage rate would be the same in the two situations.  We know that, with 
these prices, the French farmers will happily supply the same quantity of corn to the U.S. 
companies as in the former case, and that U.S. demand for French (plus U.S.) corn would be the 
same, because $0.25 per bushel in tax is added to the price in the destination-based system.  The 
U.S. computer makers are happy to accept the $750 offered by the French buyers, even though 
computer still sell for $1000 in the United States, since the sale is not included in the X Tax base 
and hence yields the same amount as a domestic sale after the $250 tax.  The U.S. Treasury still 
collects $2.5b in tax; owners of U.S. computer companies still get $7.5b in earnings that they can 
still spend on computers and corn at the original terms. 
Note that, in view of the equivalence between the outcomes in these two situations, we 
would want to describe them in international trade statistics as being the same.  This would be 
accomplished by measuring both exports and imports, not at what the U.S. exporter or importer 
receives or pays, but at their value in the U.S. market.  Under the origin-based tax system, these 
two are the same but in the destination-based system, they differ by the applicable U.S. tax.  
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In this example, I used a lower price level in France to generate the economic 
equivalence between the two tax regimes.  I could as readily have used a higher price level in the 
United States.  Alternatively, some readers may find it easier to think of a variation in the 
exchange rate between different currencies used in the two countries, with no difference in the 
general price levels between the two tax regimes.  So, suppose under the initial, origin-based 
situation, one dollar ($1) buys ten French francs (Ffr 10).  Computers sell for Ffr 10,000 each 
and corn for Ffr 10 a bushel.  If, in the alternative, the United States has a destination-based tax, 
all of the real opportunities in the system are the same if the exchange rate is Ffr 13.33 to the 
dollar (13.33 less 25 percent of 13.33 equals 10).  The exporter of a computer from the United 
States receives Ffr 10,000, which he exchanges for $750.  Since this sale is not subject to tax, the 
exporter keeps the whole amount; the after-tax result is the same as for a $1000 sale to a 
domestic customer.  The U.S. importer of a bushel of corn pays $.75 at the 13.33 to 1 exchange 
rate.  When the bushel is sold for $1 there is no deduction, so $.25 in tax is paid; the net proceeds 
just cover the cost of the import. 
The point to take away from this exercise is the basic economic equivalence of the two 
approaches once in place and with the same tax rate when prices are determined at arm’s length.  
The choice between these two rules for treatment of trans-border sales does, however, have 
important implications, mostly relating to transitional incidence and incentives but also relating 
to administrability, especially in situations with transactions across borders among related 
companies. 
Administrative Properties 
Bradford (2001) is centrally concerned with the way an international tax system based on 
universal use national X Taxes could resolve a variety of problems that vex the present  
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international income tax regime.  I will not rehearse those matters here except to say that the key 
feature of the system contributing to its properties is its grounding in cash-flow accounting for 
sales and purchases of goods and services only (with, in general, exclusion of financial 
transactions from the tax base).  In the standard subtraction-method value-added tax, all that is 
required to calculate a firm's tax base is cash-flow information about real transactions – sales less 
purchases from other businesses.  It is important to note here that, for reasons that are briefly 
sketched below in connection with transition in the international context, I have come to the 
conclusion that a modification to this accounting system, to provide instead for something like 
conventional business income accounting for "real" business assets (inventories, equipment, 
structures, land, etc.), would ameliorate – in principle, eliminate – incentive and incidence 
effects of tax rate changes.  To keep the consumption-tax economic properties of the system, a 
deduction would be provided for the current cost of capital, calculated as the product of an 
appropriate interest rate and the real business asset basis (Bradford 1998).  (To be clear:  No 
deduction is allowed for interest expense.)  
Maintaining the consistency of ignoring financial transactions is important, since the 
major simplifications achieved by the X Tax are due to the fact that financial transactions are 
excluded.  This eliminates a host of intractable problems in the world of finance (Bradford 
1995).  For ordinary business tax accounting, it means no inclusion of interest or dividends 
received (and thus no rules to distinguish between them), no deduction for interest paid, and 
myriad related changes in accounting, eliminating an equally large host of tax complexities.  To 
mention one prominent problem that would disappear:  No special rules are required for capital 
gains.  Business assets are taxed on a cash-flow basis (perhaps as modified per my remarks  
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above); transactions in financial assets and liabilities, and associated financial flows, such as 
payments of dividends and interest, are out of the base. 
These administrative advantages extend to the international version of the system.  New 
administrative problems are, however, introduced by the border adjustment in the case of the 
destination-based system.  The exclusion of sales to abroad requires monitoring methods to 
assure that the payments in question really come from foreign purchasers (rather than domestic 
consumers).  The disallowance of deduction for purchases from abroad requires monitoring 
incoming travelers at the borders (since it has the effect of subjecting imports to tax), as is done 
by customs inspectors at present.  Different from import tariffs, however, is the treatment of 
imports by businesses; since a denial of a deduction is involved, there is no need to monitor 
business imports.  This might be implemented by requiring businesses to justify deductions by 
providing the tax identification numbers of suppliers; a foreign supplier would not have a U.S. 
tax identification number (Lokken 2001). 
The disadvantage of monitoring the border is offset by a major plus of a destination-
based tax, its elimination of the transfer-pricing problem.  The need to value purchases and sales 
among related domestic and foreign companies is a perennial problem in the existing income tax.  
The problem is greatly magnified by the ever-growing importance of intangible property in the 
generation of profit and the rapid growth of intra-firm trade (Gordon and Hines, 2002).  Since 
the proceeds of a sale to a foreign customer are not in the destination-based X Tax base, the price 
that related partners may use to account for the transaction has no impact on the tax base.  The 
same holds for an import from abroad.  The price does not matter because there is no deduction. 
Under the origin-based system, by contrast, there is no need to police the borders for 
imports (apart from customs requirements).  This property becomes especially important when  
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we take into account the possibility that consumers may cross borders to do their consuming.  I 
call this the “tourism problem," with the caveat that the term may seem to imply it is confined to 
cross-border shopping on temporary excursions.  It applies as well to the situation of a U.S. 
individual who times consumption to take place in a low-tax jurisdiction – for example, during 
retirement years – and thereby avoids the tax that would fall on a person who remained in the 
United States.  The price of avoiding the need for monitoring the borders is, however, to bring 
back the transfer-pricing problem. 
Supernormal Returns, Measurement Issues and Transfer Pricing Problems 
To illustrate some of these points in our abstract international economy, we need to 
change the stipulated facts.  We can, for example, add capital transactions – a U.S. investor 
might lend $1m to a French borrower.  To postpone dealing with time more systematically, 
suppose the loan and repayment (without interest, because the time is so short) occur between 
8:00 am and noon of the one day in the model.  Such financial transactions are ignored in the X 
Tax so this round trip transaction would have no tax consequences, direct or indirect.  A slightly 
more interesting transaction could, however, have indirect tax consequences:  The French 
borrower agrees to pay off the outcome of a $1m bet in the French stock market, which is open 
from 8:00 am until noon.  At noon, the financial arrangement is wound up, with the U.S. investor 
having made a profit or a loss, relative to the $1m put up at 8:00 am.  This result will ultimately 
– for illustrative purposes, I am assuming immediately – result in an increase (if the investment 
is a winner) in imports to the United States from France, or a decrease (if the investment is a 
loser).  In a destination-based tax, the result is a change in U.S. tax revenues, since imports are 
not deducted but sales to the public (which are affected) are subject to tax.  In that world, the 
U.S. fisc shares in the fortunes of U.S. financial investments abroad (since they affect  
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consumption in the United States).  In the origin-based system, the changes in sales to the public 
that result from the working out of the illustrative financial position are matched by changes in 
deductions for imports, so there are no indirect tax consequences. 
The expected return on a financial investment will generally embody a risk premium 
(which, as illustrated by insurance, could be negative).  In the example, it may be that the 
expected payoff to the financial investment in France (net of the invested amount) is positive and 
we might say it incorporates the expectation of a “supernormal return.”  This expected 
supernormal return is subject to U.S. tax indirectly, if the system is on a destination basis.  It is 
ignored if the system is on an origin basis.  There is, presumably, no policy significance to this 
tax difference in this case.  The U.S. tax stake in the foreign investment simply compensates for 
the portion of the risk taken on by the U.S. fisc.  (For a discussion of the general issues involved 
see, for example, Kaplow 1994,Bradford 1995 or Zodrow 1995). 
A different form of “supernormal return” is at issue in the classic transfer-pricing 
situation.  To adapt our illustration for the purpose, suppose the patent for producing the 
computers in our example is owned by a U.S. company.  Since a computer sells for $1000, and 
all that is required to produce one is the patent right, that right will also sell (at arm’s length) for 
$1000.  Now, instead of having the U.S. company export computers, suppose it exports to a 
French company the rights to produce 1 million computers for a licensing fee of $1000 per unit.  
In this fact situation, the tax consequences and exchange rate or price level outcomes under the 
alternative regimes are the same as in the earlier example of the export of computers from the 




If the licensing transaction as described is at arm’s length, that is, between parties with 
opposing interests in its terms, this example presents no fresh administrative problems.  New 
issues may arise, however, if, as is typical, the payoff to the licensor were to take the form of a 
share of the profits from the sale of computers by the French licensee, or a royalty per unit sold 
in the future.  What I, at least, think of as the conceptually “correct” accounting for this 
transaction would be to value the sale of license rights at $1b, which is of direct tax consequence 
only in the origin-based system.  The subsequent actual payoff to the U.S. owner of the rights 
would be treated as a financial transaction, with no direct tax consequences in either system.  In 
the case of an uncertain return, the indirect tax consequences of the financial portion of the 
transaction would be different under the origin- and destination-principle regimes, as discussed 
above. 
But the actual terms of the transaction may not reveal this conceptually correct amount.  
Using as an alternative the cash-flows attributable to the licensing arrangement (royalties), for 
example, will give a different result.  (If one can ignore timing issues, the tax consequences of 
this approach will be an economically equivalent result if the arrangement is at arm’s length.)  
There are no direct tax consequences, in any case, in the destination-based system; in the origin-
based system, the direct tax liability will be proportional to the payment, of whichever form.  In 
particular, the risky form may include a “supernormal return” element. 
Where, however, the French company is, in fact, owned by the U.S. computer company, 
the licensing transaction is functionally internal to the firm, whatever may be the legal structure 
of the companies.  In the origin-based system, the terms of the transaction matter.  Now there are 
two problems.  The first is converting the possibly contingent terms of the transaction (for 
example, a royalty per computer) into the arguably correct equivalent certain current amount.   
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This is no different from the same problem for arrangements reached at arm’s length.  Much 
more serious, and also sometimes described as involving supernormal returns, is determining 
appropriate arm’s lengths terms, whatever their form.  Since the transaction is effectively within 
a single entity, its terms on the books of the two nominally separate companies are referred to as 
“transfer prices.”  Because transfer prices need have no significance apart from their use in 
determining tax or other regulatory consequences, they can and will be adjusted to optimize 
those consequences.  The check on this optimization in the tax context is to require the prices, or 
the terms of transactions more generally, to be those that would be reached at arm’s length.  If 
the two companies are dealing in bushels of corn, it is a straightforward matter to determine the 
requisite arm’s length prices.  When, however, they are dealing in complex goods and services, 
as in the example of a license to sell a particular form of computer, the arm’s length standard 
leaves a very wide range of choice for the taxpayer companies.  (Because the economic 
justification for ownership extending across national borders may be synergies internal to the 
firm, arm’s length terms may not even be well defined.)  This is the transfer-pricing problem in 
tax administration. 
To illustrate, suppose the U.S. parent knows that computers can be sold for $1000 but 
this is not a fact easily discerned by the tax authorities.  The U.S. parent therefore licenses the 
wholly owned French company to sell computers for a royalty of $500 per computer, or $0.5b 
for the run of 1m computers in the illustrative transaction.  In a destination-based U.S. tax 
system, these terms are of no significance, since the sale of services to the foreign company are 
not taken into tax directly.  The payoffs to such foreign investments are, however, reflected 
indirectly in the tax base, when they affect imports of goods and services (which are sold in the 
United States subject to tax but support no deduction).  In the origin-based system, the royalty  
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determines the U.S. tax base of $0.5b in this case, compared to the $1b tax base that would have 
obtained under arm’s length terms.  The profit obtained by the French subsidiary can then be 
repatriated to the parent company as a dividend on equity, a financial transaction that is not taken 
into the tax base, directly or indirectly, under the standard rules. 
Under the nonstandard rules that I suggest below to eliminate, or at least to minimize, the 
opportunity for related companies to game an origin-based X Tax through such transfer-pricing 
devices, the transactions between parent and subsidiary are aggregated (so dividends are treated 
as sales).  Dealing with changing tax rates over time requires an additional feature.  To illustrate 
it requires introducing time explicitly. 
Transition and Tax Rate Changes over Time 
A particularly important set of issues bearing on the choice between origin- and 
destination-basis approaches, involving both allocative efficiency and equity, is raised by 
transition.  The obvious transition is from the existing tax regime to the X Tax regime.  Since the 
treatment of international business in the existing income tax system is essentially on an origin 
basis (sales to abroad are counted in income and purchases from abroad are deducted), it is the 
potential shift to a destination-based tax that poses the distinctive problems.   This, in turn, is 
most easily analyzed in terms of a switch from an origin- to a destination-based X Tax.  This 
transition amounts to an increase in the tax rate "forgiven" on exports and imposed on imports 
from zero (under the origin-basis tax) to the full X Tax business rate (under the destination-based 
tax).  Furthermore, the problems associated with this transition are repeated any time there is a 
change in the business X Tax rate in a destination-, but not in an origin-, based tax. 
A similar phenomenon is encountered in the choice I have mentioned above between a 
cash-flow business tax and an economically equivalent tax that uses income accounting for  
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business assets, including a separation of capital and current transactions, with an allowance of a 
deduction for the capital tied up replacing the immediate expensing of capital outlays.  The 
capital cost deduction would be determined by multiplying the capital in the business, as 
measured by basis, by an appropriate rate of interest.  I think it will help understanding of the 
international tax problem to review the transition issue in this purely domestic context. 
Generic Features of Transition to this Type of Tax 
Transition to a consumption type tax, such as the X Tax, from an income type tax with 
current accrual accounting, such as the existing system, raises significant issues of incidence and 
efficiency.  Most of those engaged in tax policy debates are familiar with the major point:  
Shifting from accrual to pure cash-flow accounting imposes a one-time tax on "old capital" or, 
more precisely under income tax accounting conventions, "existing basis" in the nonfinancial 
assets of businesses (Bradford, 1996a; Pearlman, 1996; Hall, 1996; Zodrow, 2002).  Whether 
this is fair in the context of a major tax restructuring is debatable (Kotlikoff, 1996; Shaviro, 
2000).  It is not debatable that it presents significant incentive problems, since taxpayers can 
mitigate the burden of the transition impact, perhaps significantly, by selling their assets to 
increase consumption in anticipation of the change in regimes.  Both equity (accepting the 
premise that it is unfair to impose such a transition burden on taxpayers) and efficiency 
considerations support the adoption of the income style accounting for business activity that I 
briefly alluded to above.  (If all that were involved were a one-time change in the applicable X 
Tax business tax rate, from zero to some fixed level, the same result would be obtained with 




The Tomato Juice Problem 
I like to use the following numerical example to illustrate this problem of transition from 
an accrual business income tax to a cash-flow business tax (Bradford 1996a).  In that case, 
consider a retailer who purchases $10,000 worth of canned tomato juice on December 31.  The 
next day, the cash-flow business tax replaces an accrual income tax.  The retailer sells the tomato 
juice for an apparently break-even sum of $10,000.  This sale is taken into income.  Under an 
accrual income tax, there would be an offsetting deduction of the $10,000 cost of goods sold, 
reflecting the outlays for the inventory in the previous year.  But under the cash-flow tax, only 
current-year outlays are deductible.  So the retailer is stuck with the full amount of the tax on his 
inventory.  The extra tax remains, regardless of the character of the economic adjustment to the 
changed regime (for example, it is unaffected if there is a general price level increase in the 
amount of the new tax; see Bradford 1996a). 
To work out the incidence and allocational effects of the transition, we need to think 
through how people would behave to avoid the burden.  The traditional approach treats the 
introduction of the cash-flow tax as a completely unanticipated event (Feldstein, 1976).  In that 
case, the transition effect (the tax on the inventory of tomato juice) is completely borne by the 
taxpayer who happens to own the assets affected.  At the other extreme, if the introduction of the 
tax is anticipated far in advance, no one will be foolish enough to hold assets across the 
boundary of introduction of the cash-flow accounting unless doing so is rewarded by an 
appropriately high real reward.  In the case of the tomato juice example, presumably, businesses 
would hold inventory from December 31 to January 1 of the transition year only under the 
expectation that consumers will pay a premium for the service provided by the retailer – as an 
alternative to buying their tomato juice before the transition and storing it in their kitchen  
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cabinets.  The generic point is that an anticipated change to the cash-flow from an income tax 
regime – or of an increase in the tax rate under a cash-flow regime – cannot in the absence of 
transactions costs impose any particular tax burden on the owners of the assets subject to the 
transition penalty.  Instead, it will impose a tax disincentive on pre-transition investment with 
returns extending into the post-transition period – driving up the pre-tax rate of return and 
driving down the interest rate applicable to commitments that cross the temporal boundary 
between the two regimes.  There would then be a positive incentive to invest right after the 
transition – driving up the interest rates for commitments extending forward from the transition 
boundary.  The incidence effects are those of the peculiarly time-varying rate of tax on the return 
to investment, with its associated impact on efficiency. 
The incidence of an unanticipated decline in a cash-flow tax rate, and the incentive 
effects of an anticipated decline in the tax rate, are simply the opposite of those for an increase in 
the tax rate. 
Using Income-Style Accounting to Avoid the Problem 
One of the strengths of true accrual income as a tax base is its insensitivity to changes in 
the rate of tax.  Income tax accounting principles incorporate this idea in their insistence on 
associating income with particular years – rules that would measure income over several years 
but give effect to the same discounted tax, given a constant tax rate, are therefore generally 
shunned.   
This property can be turned to the service of a consumption-type tax by making use of 
the familiar concept of basis in real assets.  In practice, this would mean maintaining something 
like the present system of accounting for depreciable assets and inventories instead of the 
expensing of capital outlays of the classic cash-flow consumption-type tax.  To preserve the  
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consumption base as the effective principle, an allowance would be provided for the cost of 
capital deployed in the business, calculated as the product of an appropriately chosen rate of 
interest and basis (Bradford 1996a).  (This should not be confused with a deduction for interest 
paid; there would be neither taxation of nor deduction of interest payments in the system.) 
The ideal of this approach, as of theoretical Haig-Simons income accounting, is mark-to-
market valuation of assets.  An increase in value of an asset during the year would be added to 
the tax base in that year and also added to the basis of the asset, eligible for the interest 
allowance and recoverable as a deduction upon disposal of the asset.  Boadway and Bruce (1984) 
may have been the first to describe the theoretical underpinnings of this system, which was 
actually briefly put into practice in Croatia (Rose and Wiswesser, 1998).  Its implementation 
presents a number of challenges worth closer examination that we can undertake here.  Two such 
challenges, however, merit mention.  The first is the determination of the appropriate rate of 
interest to use in the calculation of the cost of capital used in the business.  The idea is that a 
business owner should be indifferent between the depreciation plus interest on basis that goes 
with an investment and immediate write-off, taking due account of the possibilities that financial 
markets will present to convert one form of cash flow to another.  The second is the system’s call 
for information on accruing changes in asset values.  This requirement has long been recognized 
as an Achilles heal of the accrual income tax standard.  In this connection it is significant that, 
unlike for an income tax, accuracy in the timing of deductions is unimportant so long as the rate 
of tax is constant.  The cost of capital allowance compensates for postponing deductions, and 
reduction of the allowance offsets the advantage of any acceleration of deductions, relative to the 
mark-to-market standard, that the rules may allow.  (Throughout this paper I abstract from an  
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important aspect of capital accounting, the need to allow for inflation in rendering comparable 
amounts at different dates.) 
The importance of matching the basis of assets to market value is confined to conditions 
of changing tax rate.  To illustrate, suppose inventory with market value $100 is carried on a 
company’s books with a basis of $50.  If the tax rate is going to increase between the present and 
the next period, it is advantageous to realize now, so that the $50 excess of basis over market 
will be taxed at the present, rather than the next-period rate.  The opposite holds if the basis of 
the asset is $150, $50 over current market value.  Then it will pay to postpone realization.  These 
accelerations and postponements translate into systematic distortions of investment.  The 
workability of imperfect asset accounting in the X Tax context is premised on the likelihood that 
tax rate changes will be relatively slow, infrequent and hard to predict and on the fact that 
realizing the market value of typical business assets is not as easy as in the case of inventories. 
The Fundamental Problem of Rate Changes in a Destination Tax 
The choice between origin- and destination bases for the X Tax regime raises similar 
problems.  We can get a feel for them by imagining what would be involved in making a switch 
from an origin- to a destination-basis tax. 
Since the issues here are all about timing, and not about production of different goods in 
different countries, we can examine them in a stripped-down model with just a single good 
(corn) that can be produced in either of the two countries (United States and France) and that can 
be consumed or invested in capital in either of the countries.  In the example at the beginning of 
the paper we took as a condition a situation of balanced trade.  Now we are interested precisely 
in the possibility of unbalanced trade, so we need to introduce the element of time, which I do by 
specifying a two-period world.  As in the earlier example, we assume that there is an X Tax (or  
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subtraction-method consumption tax on goods and services) in the United States only.  Any 
taxes in France use some other approach.  The U.S. tax may be of either the destination- or 
origin-type. 
Start with an origin-basis tax, say at a rate of 25 percent; the price of corn in the two 
countries must be the same, say $1 per bushel.  In France, the wage rate is also $1 (some other 
tax is used to pay for government); in the United States the wage rate is $.75.  In the first period, 
the good is exported and imported in some quantities, and at the end of the day there exist 
various borrowing, lending, and wealth-holding (stocks of corn) situations, some crossing the 
national border. 
We need not go through all the details; it suffices to illustrate the problem created by a 
shift in the U.S. tax from origin to destination basis between the first and second period.  
Between the first and second period, shift to allow a border adjustment for the U.S. 25 percent 
tax.  Now, to equilibrate trade in the single commodity, the price has to change in the United 
States or France.  Suppose it drops in France and stays at $1 in the United States; stocks of corn 
in France now sell for $.75 per bushel, instead of $1.  For someone planning to consume in 
France, this is no problem.  But there is a problem for a U.S. resident, owning a stock of corn in 
France but desiring to consume at home. 
Thus, suppose I, a U.S. resident, own a stock of corn in France.  I got my stock by 
sending some corn to a French consumer in the first period.  In general, I will have earned a 
return on my stock, so it will be more than I sent over in the first period.  We need not spell out 
this detail either.  Before the destination tax, I could import my stock to the United States 
without tax.  In the new situation, when I want to bring my corn home to the United States, I  
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must pay a tax of $.25 per bushel, based on its U.S. market price of $1 per bushel.  So I only get 
to consume three quarters of what I had anticipated at the time of my export to France. 
The impact of a shift in regime from an origin to a destination basis is analytically the 
same as an increase in the rate of a desination-based tax from zero to 25 percent.  More 
generally, the incidence phenomenon sketched here would accompany any change in the rate of 
a desination-based tax.  (A drop in the rate would imply a gain for my illustrative claimant on 
France.)  As in the analogous case of an increase in the rate of a cash-flow tax in a purely 
domestic setting, in the international context incidence effects – gains and losses based on saving 
or portfolio commitments established before the policy shift – depend on whether the change is, 
as in the example, completely unanticipated.  If it is completely anticipated, the incidence effects 
must be built into the anticipated returns.  In the example, I would certainly not have exchanged 
my corn in the first period for a claim on an equal amount of corn in France, to be redeemed 
(with an ordinary rate of return) in the second period.  Either the actuality of a change in tax 
regime (or tax rate) or the risk that it might happen would, in theory at least, greatly influence the 
international capital market. 
An unanticipated shift from an origin-based tax to a destination-based tax would impose 
a one-time tax at the X Tax rate on the net claims of U.S. taxpayers on the rest of the world.  If 
the net claims are positive, the tax is a loss to the U.S. claimants and a gain to the U.S. fisc.  If 
the net claims are negative, the tax would be negative (and there would be a cost to the U.S. 
fisc).  Corresponding to these incidence effects would be incentive/allocative effects to the extent 
the change in policy is anticipated, and there would be ongoing incentive/allocative effects from 
the ongoing risk of tax rate changes.   
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It would be useful to know how important, quantitatively, are the incidence and 
efficiency effects of transition/rate changes.  What one may think of as the direct impact 
incidence – since it is the product of the tax rate change and the net claim on foreigners (which 
could be positive or negative) – is sensitive to the size of that net claim.  If the foreign claims on 
the United States and the U.S. claims on foreigners are equal, a completely unexpected tax 
change would not have U.S. tax revenue consequences (at least in terms of present discounted 
value).  Still, U.S. owners of claims on foreigners would lose and foreign owners of claims on 
U.S. residents would gain from an increase in the tax rate/shift from origin- to destination-based 
tax.  Furthermore, the incentive effects of anticipated rate changes do not depend upon the 
balance of claims.  It is hard to image that an anticipated change from 0 to, say, 28 percent would 
not have quantitatively significant impacts. 
It is true that European economies have somehow made the transition to destination-
based value-added taxes of 15-20 percent without obvious consequences of the type I have 
described but it is not clear that anyone has looked for such consequences.  Furthermore, it is 
well known that the European value-added taxes, at least initially, substituted for turnover taxes 
of broadly similar economic character.  One could describe their introduction as a rationalization 
of a destination-type value-added tax structure.  Consequently, without having done the hard 
work to assess the proposition, I would surmise that the issue raised here is quantitatively 
significant. 
In most of the examples I chose to look at a change from an origin- to a destination-based 
tax advisedly.  Since the treatment of sales and purchases of goods and services in the U.S. 
income tax is today on an origin basis (business sales to foreign customers are counted in gross 
income and purchases from abroad are deducted, perhaps on a delayed basis if on capital  
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account), adopting an origin-based X Tax would presumably have relatively small incidence and 
allocation effects of the sort described above. 
A Remedy for the Transfer-Pricing Problem in an Origin-Based X Tax 
In view of the advantages of the origin-based approach (transition problems, including 
ongoing transition problems associated with tax rate changes, much less than in the destination-
based approach; monitoring the borders not necessary; no “tourism” problem), a method of 
reducing or eliminating the transfer-pricing problem would be of considerable value.  In what 
follows I suggest such a method.  The ideas are preliminary, and have not been subjected to the 
acid test of the search by clever tax advisors to game the proposed system.  In my view, 
however, the approach merits close study. 
Cash-Flow Accounting for Foreign Subsidiaries:  The Domestic Installment-Sale Analogy 
The cross-boundary transfer-pricing problem is analogous to the problem of taxing the 
domestic sale to a consumer (or a nontaxable entity) of an ordinary commodity, say an 
automobile, on an installment basis.  In the standard X Tax accounting (as under a conventional 
value-added tax), interest received is not included in tax.  By bundling the sale of the car with 
the credit sale contract, specifying a low price on the car but a high rate of interest on the loan, a 
company can keep the cash flow from the buyer constant but convert it in part into a nontaxable 
form.  A similar logic is at work when the company sells a car to its foreign subsidiary for an 
artificially low price.  In this case the payment in return takes the form of a financial transaction 
(a dividend) that is not subject to X Tax.  (I use “foreign subsidiary” to stand for “related party” 
here.  The key question is whether transactions involve the sort of opposition of interests that we 
summarize in the arm’s length characterization.  Implementing the approach I am about to 
outline would require a specification of these conditions.)  
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McLure and Zodrow (1996) regard this problem as sufficiently serious to merit 
aggregating all transactions of companies, financial and real, in determining the cash-flow 
business tax base, thereby implementing an “R+F” (“real plus financial”) company tax, in the 
terminology of the Meade Committee (Institute for Fiscal Studies 1978).  A more narrowly 
targeted remedy in the installment sale case is to require cash-flow treatment of the bundled 
transaction (Bradford 1996a,b).  So if the financing is not organized at arm’s length, the seller is 
taxed on all payments received for the car, however labeled and at whatever time.  The 
characteristic exemption of interest in a consumption-based tax means that the seller will be 
indifferent between arm’s length terms and the bundled terms. 
Once we are in this world, however, there are fresh incentives when the tax rate is not 
constant.  By charging a low price for the car and high interest rate on the loan, the seller can 
move tax base from the present into the future.  If the future tax rate is lower than the present, 
this is advantageous.  Conversely, if the tax rate is going up in the future, by charging an above-
market price for the car and a below-market interest rate on the loan, the seller can concentrate 
the tax base in the current period.  Protection against such manipulation can be implemented by a 
requirement that the car sales price be an arm’s length price.  A possible alternative or additional 
requirement, that I do not pursue here, would be arm’s length conditions on the loan that is 
embedded in the installment contract.  This may seem to leave us with the problem we started 
with.  But typically the stakes will be much lower (and with the possibility of rate changes either 
up or down, gaming the system is more difficult), so the importance for tax administration of 
getting the price “right” will be less.  
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Applying the Approach to Multinational Corporate Family Members 
The case of related-party transactions across national jurisdictional boundaries in an 
origin-basis tax is similar to the installment-sale example in involving conversion of a taxable 
sale to a nontaxable financial payments.  I suggest a two-part approach to this problem.  First is 
bundling of the goods and services and financial flows through aggregation of the transactions 
between related parties.  Second, the familiar income tax concept of basis is deployed to inhibit 
the manipulation of financial flows to exploit tax rate changes over time. 
To use the basic bundling approach of the installment sale example, when Ford U.S. 
(FUS) sells motors to Ford Canada (FC), its wholly owned subsidiary, all payments from FC to 
FUS with respect to these engines would be taken into U.S. tax, as representing current or 
deferred payment for the motors.  The analysis goes through as before, including the U.S. tax 
system’s stakes in getting the nonfinancial price (the price of the motors) “right” when the tax 
rate is changing through time. 
There is a fresh difficulty, however.  It will generally not make sense to isolate a single 
sale and its consequences.  When FUS sells motors to FC at a below-market price, the payoff is 
higher future dividends from FC to FUS, which are the result of all the operations of the two 
companies, not confined to the transactions involving the motors.  The suggested remedy is to 
treat the entire financial relationship on a bundled basis.  Any financial transfer from FUS to FC 
would be deducted and any payment from FC to FUS would be included in U.S. tax. 
To illustrate, if FUS sets up FC by transferring $1b to FC, the amount would be deducted 
from the U.S. tax base.  When, subsequently, FC sends a dividend back to FUS, the amount 
would be included in the U.S. tax base.  Now suppose that FUS sells FC $1m worth of motors 
for an artificial transfer price that means FUS is paid only $700k, which is subject to U.S. tax.   
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This reduces the FUS tax base by $300k, compared with a transaction at arm’s length.  But the 
implication is an increase in subsequent dividends from FC to FUS by $300k (in present value – 
the dividends may take place in the future).  With constant tax rate, the result is a wash – no gain 
from the manipulation of the transfer price. 
The problems that arise when the tax rate is not constant are, however, more serious than 
in the case of the illustrative installment sale.  By large transfers to and from a foreign sub, a 
U.S. parent could exploit even small year-to-year differences in the U.S. tax rate.  A possible 
remedy for this problem, as in the analogous domestic situation discussed above, is to follow 
principles of timing underlying the existing income tax, in which income is assigned to particular 
years so the taxpayer does not have a choice in this regard. 
The Use of Basis 
To return to the purely domestic context, the X Tax would use capitalization rules for 
ordinary business assets more or less along present lines.  The difference from an income tax 
would be the allowance of a deduction for the normal return on basis.  In the international 
context, the analogous reasoning would apply to an equity position in a foreign subsidiary.  Now 
a transfer from parent to subsidiary gives rise, not to a current deduction but to an addition to 
parent’s basis in the subsidiary.  A transfer from the subsidiary to parent – that is, a dividend – 
would be deducted from the parent’s basis. 
The basis device with respect to transfers between parent and subsidiary protects against 
essentially unlimited exploitation of tax rate variation across time.  As in the installment-sale 
case, there remains the potential to exploit tax rate variation via transfer prices in the “real” 
domain.  To illustrate:  FUS sells FC $1m worth of motors for an artificial transfer price that 
means FUS is paid only $700k.  This reduces the FUS tax base by $300k, compared with a  
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transaction at arm’s length.  To simplify, suppose the interest rate is zero.  Next year, FC sends 
home to FUS the profit of $300k made on the sale of the motors (presumably built into their 
assembled cars).  If the tax rate is lower in the second year than in the first, FUS gains from this 
set of transactions.  The required remedy is the same as in the present system, to attempt to 
assure the price of the motors is the arm’s length price.  The fact that the stakes in the proposed 
approach are in the intertemporal difference in the tax rate, not in timing (because of the interest 
allowance on basis) or the entire rate, should help to make it workable. 
We can check that the approach works for relations between a foreign parent and U.S. 
sub:  Suppose Farma Switzerland (FS) sells its products through a wholly-owned U.S. 
subsidiary, Farma U.S. (FUS).  The basic rule is that a transfer of funds from FS to FUS is 
included in the U.S. tax base of FUS, and a transfer from FUS to FS is deducted from the U.S. 
tax base of FUS.  For the same reason discussed above, these inclusions and deductions would 
be run through basis accounting but that is primarily directed at the problem of time-varying tax 
rate.  We can more easily trace the logic of the system by using the straight inclusion and 
deduction approach.  To simplify, assume the interest rate is zero (and that investments earn 
exactly the market rate of interest).  If FS transfers $1m to FUS and earns the going rate of 
return, FUS will be liable for tax on the $1m inbound investment and will get a deduction of 
equal discounted value when it returns the investment, plus profit, to FS. 
Now suppose FS sells $1m worth of cosmetics to FUS for $1.3m.   The immediate impact 
is a deduction of $1.3m from the FUS U.S. tax base.  But a further impact is a reduction, by 
$.3m, of the deduction for profit remitted by FUS to FS, compared to the accounting at the arm’s 
length price.  So there is no tax benefit from manipulating the transfer price.  
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As in the example of the U.S. parent and Canadian sub, because there would be an 
advantage from this sequence of transactions in the event of time-varying U.S. tax rate, there is a 
U.S. tax system stake in getting the transfer price right.  The possibility of time-varying tax rates 
also means that the treatment of transfers would run through basis.  In the example, when If FS 
transfers $1m to FUS, there will be no current U.S. tax consequences but FUS will have a 
negative basis (i.e., liability) in the amount of $1m.  When there is a positive rate of interest, 
FUS will be charged for holding the negative basis (possibly by additions to the negative basis).  
When FUS transfers to FS, there is a conceptual deduction but this is replaced by an addition to 
basis in the amount of the rebated profit. 
Mark to Market? 
The potential to profit from timing of transactions (sale of assets in the simple domestic 
setting) is eliminated by true mark-to-market accounting.  The use of conventional depreciation 
accounting is necessarily accepted for ordinary business assets because market values are not 
available.  (Reminder:  With constant tax rate, these timing issues are of no significance in a 
present value sense.)  In the international setting, the analogy would call for adjusting basis in 
foreign subsidiaries by the amount of accounting profit or loss.  In present-system terms, there 
would be no deferral of foreign income or loss.  Unrepatriated earnings of a subsidiary would be 
taxed currently to the parent but added to basis.  (Losses of a subsidiary would result in a current 
deduction by the parent and subtraction from basis.)  Because basis earns an interest allowance, 
there would be no present-value significance to getting this exactly right over time spans with 
constant tax rate.  Getting it right is significant only with changing tax rate.  
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Treatment of Loans and Transition 
Among details to be resolved in implementation of the suggested system is the 
identification of the transfers between related parties that are brought into the system and 
treatment of positions of firms prior to its introduction.  I can do no more here than suggest 
approaches to these issues.  As to the first, transactions labeled “debt” between parent and 
subsidiary could be used to exploit differences between the domestic and foreign tax rates.  As in 
the case of the domestic installment sale example, erring on the side of bringing too much into 
the comprehensive accounting (so taxing all payments for the car) is, in principle, a safe course.  
The result is a wash if the transaction is on arm’s length terms.  Questions of monitoring and 
administrative costs would probably dominate in evaluating alternative rules. 
As for the second issue, in the transition to a purely domestic X Tax, companies would 
carry basis in their real business assets into the new system.  Exactly analogously, a U.S. 
company’s basis in ownership claims to affiliates (and perhaps for debt claims, depending on the 
treatment chosen for related-party debt), treated like basis in real assets.  For a foreign-owned 
U.S. company, the relevant basis would be negative, reflecting the equity claim of the foreign 
parent. 
Conclusion 
Although I have not dwelled on it here, there is no denying the simplicity advantage of 
the straight cash-flow treatment of sales and purchases of goods and services in the purely 
domestic context, or of the destination-principle extension to international transactions.  The 
main justification for considering the modification in the domestic rules, involving capital 
accounts for businesses and a deduction for the capital thus tied up, is to neutralize the system 
with respect to changes in the business tax rate over time, especially the change that would occur  
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as the new system is introduced.  The same justification applies to the attempt describe in this 
paper to use an analogous approach to implementing origin-principle treatment of sales and 
purchases that cross international boundaries.   
The main challenge in implementing the origin approach is dealing with transfer pricing 
– the ability of companies to manipulate the terms of transactions among commonly owned 
entities located in different countries, so as to locate the tax base where the rate of tax is lowest.  
The basic tax planning tool is to manipulate the boundary between real (taxed) and financial 
(normally not taxed) transactions.  The remedy suggested here builds on an analogy with an 
installment sale to a consumer in the purely domestic context, which presents the opportunity, 
through non-arm’s lengths terms of the financial part of the contract, to convert taxable to tax 
free payments.  In the case of commonly owned domestic and foreign companies, the line is 
between domestic and foreign tax jurisdictions, and the details of the aggregation, involving the 
use of capital accounts and a corresponding deduction for business capital, are somewhat more 
involved. 
There is no doubt that the approach I have outlined is more complicated than the 
destination principle’s exclusion of goods and services transactions.  On the other hand, the fact 
that it relies on basically familiar concepts from income tax accounting is a strength.  If 
successful, it would open the possibility for achieving the advantages of the origin-based 
approach without its principle disadvantage. 
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